Interim Governance Arrangements in Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings (2-3)
Robert Forster
Type of crisis sparking the transition. Interim governance arrangements following electoral crisis, political deadlock or coups d’état are more likely to attempt targeted reforms in specific areas, such as the electoral system, decentralization or the under-representation of groups in particular sectors, such as the civil service and military, in addition to building confidence in the government through power-sharing, rather than undergo major reform processes (e.g. Guinea 2020, Guinea-Bissau 1999, Lebanon 2008). In contrast, secessionist conflicts focus on decentralization as a core area of concern (Papua New Guinea/Bougainville 1994, 1998; Philippines/Mindanao 2012). Stakeholders in prolonged civil conflicts, on the other hand, are more likely to demand an overhaul of the state and implement exhaustive reform programmes targeting multiple sectors (e.g. Sudan 2005, Nepal 2007). The exception to this generalization is if incumbent governments in so-called ‘unilateral peace processes’ provide an offer of reform to avoid mass defection, such as in Bahrain (2000) or Algeria (1994), where more limited reforms are likely to be put in place. In each case, therefore, the type of crisis will likely impact the type and extent of proposed reforms.
Symbolic need for change. Some institutions during a transition are seen as part of the root cause of the crisis, and this will place them clearly on any agenda for change. Issues of symbolism can include extant constitutional orders that allow for the perpetuation of poor governance or that have become irrelevant in the face of emergency legislation and therefore require renewal. Security agencies and the military may be linked to human rights abuses or oppression and require reform to re-establish trust. When transitions aim to facilitate increased democratization, there may be popular demand for an overhaul of central institutions to facilitate a ‘break’ with the old system. In Egypt, for instance, at the outset of the transition led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, constitutional reform was viewed as a central pillar in terms of providing symbolic change from the previous regime.
Stage of negotiations. The level of detail of interim governance arrangements also varies depending on the context at different points in a negotiation process. Simpler ‘roadmap’- style documents that provide a summary of necessary reforms will go into less detail on how these reforms will be achieved. The Arta Declaration that proposed interim governance arrangements in Somalia in 2000 is an example of such a document. To account for the lack of detail, many interim governance arrangements are negotiated through multiple agreements that lay out the agreed changes in a piecemeal fashion.3 ‘Blueprint’ documents, however, ‘set an agenda’ that is comprehensive in scope and less ambiguous than roadmaps. These can be produced by assembling multiple agreements into a comprehensive document, such as in Tajikistan, or as the product of long-term negotiations such as the 1999 Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone, or the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.
Pre-existing legal frameworks. Transitional arrangements will also be shaped by the pre-existing legal framework and decisions as to whether to replace, revise or ignore it. Options for ‘legalizing’ interim governance arrangements exist on a spectrum that goes from adhering to an existing constitutional framework at one end, to providing momentary ‘ruptures’ in existing legal frameworks through extra-constitutional declarations, to forming new legal frameworks which disregard those already in place at the other end. Each path has its strengths and weaknesses. Arrangements adhering to existing frameworks may face limitations on the extent of reform. In the case of sub-national arrangements, this has had implications on the extent of decentralization originally attempted in Papua New Guinea/Bougainville and the Philippines/Mindanao. Processes seeking to form entirely new legal frameworks and constitutions, on the other hand, face issues regarding the legitimacy of deliberation processes and participation, and these are explored in greater detail below. Renegotiated interim governance agreements may also become hamstrung by previously established peace and transition documents when one stakeholder refuses to depart from those structures. In the case of Yemen, a red line in the ongoing negotiation process since March 2015 is the strict adherence to the ‘three references’. These pertain to:
(a) The 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative that underpins the interim government of Abd- Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its legitimacy;
(b) The Outcomes of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference (NDC) mandated by the GCC Initiative; and
(c) The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (UN 2015) that provides the terms for contemporary peace negotiations. These documents provide a framework favourable to the Hadi government, which—after eight years in power—has lost much of its legitimacy.
1.3. Role of international actors
International political, financial and peacekeeping architectures are often critical in empowering and enabling transitions. This is particularly evident in cases where transitional governments rely on international recognition, and govern parts of the country in name only (e.g. Somalia, Yemen). Intra-state conflicts do not operate within vacuums and have an impact on neighbouring states, whether in relation to trade, migrant and refugee flows or politics in adjacent non-warring countries. Moreover, most intra-state conflicts are internationalized in multiple ways, including cross- border ethnic linkages, transnational political/military support and porous borders. Interim governments are required to meet international legal obligations on good governance and human rights to be eligible to trade and receive development and peace process funding. International actors may play critical roles in supporting the transition, including those listed below.
Technical support. International actors are sources of technical expertise that can be valuable in shaping choices by domestic stakeholders in relation to the transition, particularly during the first 18 months. Technical experts from foreign governments, multilateral organizations, international non-governmental organizations and universities provide input and training on best practice in reforming strategic sectors, drawing on practical and comparative experience. In doing so, the transmission of expertise may build the capacity and professionalize interactions between domestic stakeholders. Often, training sessions provide unofficial forums for negotiation, bringing together individuals from opposing stakeholder groups and wider civic actors. Unplanned and ad hoc interventions by international actors, however, may lead to ineffective or harmful practices. The dominance of international actors can have an impact on domestic agency by drowning out local voices, and weak coordination mechanisms between international actors may lead to conflicting aims.
Political support. Using a spectrum of measures from punitive—for example, peacekeeping, sanctions and condemnation—to less coercive ones such as forums, meetings, good offices and less formal procedures, international actors may influence the transition process by:
• enhancing the capability of stakeholders;
• boosting the visibility of marginalized groups;
• providing security guarantees (Walter 2002);
• encouraging ‘ripeness’ between the stakeholders to come to an agreement (USAID 2009: 6);
• helping to overcome difficulties inherent in identifying solutions (Walter 2002);
• forming neutral and trusted channels of communication through which mediation may take place; and
• changing relationships between stakeholders ‘by influencing the social and economic environment in which conflict and peace dynamics take place’.
Although some international actors opt for neutrality, there are also multiple instances where states or organizations actively support one conflict actor and may contribute to prolonging the conflict.
Financing interim arrangements. International actors also play an essential role in funding negotiations leading to interim governance arrangements and their implementation. Such funding can be critical as the interim state must be able to pay for salaries, goods and services to avoid increased risk of public discontent and further instability. International funding, however, regularly faces two issues. First, funding is a slow process, and second, funding tends to be short term and project based. This means that there is a degree of precarity to interim governance arrangements, which are prone to break down once the funding dries up. International funding may be derived from bilateral relationships between states, where donors pledge to support the process or aid in reconstruction. When countries are unable to secure multilateral funding, newly established interim governments may be required to ‘shop’ for mediators based on bilateral funding.
Another source of funding lies with development finance instruments related to development banks, including the World Bank, in addition to humanitarian aid. To access development funding, countries are required to have a track record in upholding certain governance and development criteria - something that war-torn countries struggle to demonstrate. Countries that do not meet the criteria are placed in an awkward position between the World Bank (and other development banks) and the UN, neither of which is able to grant longer-term funding. Often the interim period itself will not be enough time to establish a track record in achieving the necessary criteria. The political aspect of these processes is limited to the moments when countries vote on whether a country has access to funds, whereby the flow of funds becomes sustainable. Therefore, the implementation of interim governance arrangements is likely to rely on shorter-term humanitarian aid projects, as well as on donor pledges managed through Multi-Partner Trust Funds established to support governance and peacebuilding projects.
Military assistance. External actors regularly play a role in sustaining armed groups.
This practice was particularly prevalent during the Cold War but continues today in various conflict contexts such as external funding of various militant groups in Syria since 2011. During the process of consolidating interim arrangements, continued funding—particularly from multiple sources—may therefore be detrimental to the process.
Sanctions and embargoes. As a punitive measure against undesirable actions of another state, sanctions aim to restrict war-making abilities (through trade embargos) or restrict damage towards vulnerable populations (through arms embargos). Individualized or group approaches include asset freezes and travel bans. For groups funded primarily by diaspora, sanctions regulations may be helpful in curbing those sources of income, as in the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which were added to the EU sanctions list in 2006. At times, sanctions may help by bringing concessions during negotiations - for example, the threat of sanctions against Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. But they may also be harmful and harden conflict identities causing groups to ‘rally-around-the-flag’. Moreover, specific types of sanctions, such as placing individuals or groups on terrorist watch lists, may isolate some stakeholder groups that are needed for broad-based inclusion in the process, preventing engagement in dialogue and further radicalizing their stance, when legitimate claims to inclusion are not addressed. In the case of Sudan, listing the transitional government on international terrorism financing lists has proven to be a substantial issue, when attempting to secure funding for the current interim governance arrangements.
1.4. Sub-state interim governance arrangements
Sub-state interim governance may arise in response to top-down efforts to revive state capacity or as a result of local agency. Sub-state interim governance arrangements (henceforth, sub-state arrangements), which have similar features to those of the national-level phenomenon described above, are considerably less common. Nonetheless, the practice is used where a sub-state national transition from conflict to peace is attempted - for example, as part of an attempt to solve sub-national territorial conflicts. The use of sub-state arrangements is linked to sub-state conflict, and often the need to develop both a more inclusive regional settlement within a country and a new relationship between the sub-state region and the central state.
The local as a legitimizing factor. Even when the focus is not primarily on a sub-state transition, there will be a need to find ways to ground a national transition in new local governance and transition initiatives. Many political transitions focus on the national level and become vulnerable when national-level decisions are rejected in the peripheral regions. This is particularly in relation to national-level processes where developments may be separated from the citizenry and their day-to-day lives. These practices are most apparent via spatial separation constituted by concrete blocks, barbed wire, luxury hotels and talks in distant capitals. In the case of the Sudanese transition that began in 2019, the continued governance of peripheral regions by military representatives (due to previously established states of emergency) encouraged resistance to the central transition process in affected regions.
Moreover, when the principles of power-sharing on the national level are not applied to regional or local governments, localized versions of the national conflict endure. In Afghanistan, a different model was trialled where ‘citizens’ charters’ were adopted as a means of improving service delivery and state–community engagement, with the aim of furthering local ownership of development and localizing sovereignty. If an agreement on political transitions is perceived as driven or imposed by foreign governments, it damages the narrative of local ownership and creates a gap in trust that is difficult to surmount.
Fitting local arrangements into the state. Coordination mechanisms between the national and local levels are necessary regardless of whether interim arrangements are on the national or the sub-state level. For sub-state arrangements to contribute to peacebuilding beyond the management of violence in local conflicts, there needs to be a degree of coordination with peacebuilding developments on the national level. In the case of the Philippines/Mindanao, the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro provided for a new Transitional National Authority to oversee the transition in Mindanao and form a sub-state arrangement.
A Transitional Commission was then established with members appointed by both the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines to work on the sub-state constitution (the Basic Law), revisions to the Philippines Constitution, and development programmes for Mindanao (Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012 and Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2013).
Myanmar, on the other hand, struggled to facilitate coordination due to ambiguities in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 that conferred ‘tasks to be implemented during the interim period’ onto the ethnic armed organizations (EAO). However, as indicated by South et al. the agreement failed to specify these tasks or any coordination mechanism between the EAO governance mechanisms and the state. As is evident from other cases, such as Somalia, a lack of specification on how to integrate sub-state arrangements into larger settlements may allow empowered entities to emerge as spoilers that may actively resist the integration process.
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