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Unitams and the Command of Proof
by: Yusef Seraj
(-) The detailed report of the United Nations Mission to Support the Democratic Transition in Sudan (Unitams) regarding the situation during the period from May 7th to August 20th was explicit in noting the control of the Rapid Support Forces over most of the capital Khartoum and the Darfur region, except for parts of the cities of El Fasher and Nyala, while the northern and eastern states remained under the control of the army, in addition to the states of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.
(-) Unitams statement clashes with what is issued by the official media and the platforms of its supporters on social media, which continue to employ deceptive and empty boasting methods, except for some favorable content that misrepresents the facts and bets on buying time, exploiting the atmosphere of doubt and obscurity that has pervaded the Sudanese space since the outbreak of the war. However, this is no longer the most effective approach in dealing with the war crisis in its fifth month!
(-) The major paradox lies in comparing and measuring the results of the UN report with the renewed decision of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, to dissolve the Rapid Support Forces. Here, urgent questions arise about how to disband and dismantle these forces in accordance with high orders, while the same forces maintain their control on the ground, and as a result of fighting with them, millions have been forced to flee their homes in Khartoum and some cities in Darfur!
(-) Issuing decisions related to the fate of armies and militias is neither a straightforward matter nor does it tolerate improvisation and reactions. Despite the violations recorded against the Rapid Support Forces according to local and international reports, it is evident that they are a force of tens of thousands, and their services cannot be terminated without institutional procedures under the internationally recognized categories of demobilization and integration.
(-) Resolving any military component without complete control over its elements and the management of their weapons and field positions is a deadly mistake, carrying security and social risks that the country cannot bear in the current fragile situation.
(-) The decision to dissolve the Iraqi army twenty years ago stands as an unforgettable lesson, as it transformed into terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, causing corruption in the land of the two rivers and its surroundings. As a result of the reckless decision, hundreds of thousands of victims were left behind.
Insisting on dissolving any militia without legal commitment to the state may push them to commit further foolish acts and violations, making control and communication with its members a difficult task. In the proliferation of armed movements, we have endless and unending cycles.