The Relationship of Sudanese Political Forces to Military Coups d état

Ameer Babiker Abdallah
Translated by moatinoon

Talk of the states civilian and military position emerged most visibly during the glorious December 2018 revolution and thereafter, with frequent repercussions as a result of the resounding fall of the 30 June 1989 coup regime. The revolution resurfaced the founding questions of a State that has been absent since independence and continues to suffer the pain of the Great Dreams. The fallen regime was the most visible representative of the failure of post-independence national regimes and represented the height of the obstacle to the realization of those dreams, while the repercussions of the 30 years in which I tighten his grip on the country have been held till today.

It should be noted here that there is a general confusion between State institutions and power (The Government) of some have a civilian emblem in military confrontation or vice versa, and it goes without saying that the State is made up of many institutions with two civilian and military divisions, which are essentially of a service nature through which the political authority implements its programme, which has elevated it to the rule in the service of the nation, without directing it to serve fewer interests. Just as there are civil institutions that underpin the civil service, such as ministries, interests and institutions armed forces , there are also institutions of a purely military nature, There are military agencies of a civilian nature in their services, such as civilian institutions. civil services in most of its departments, while the military side is limited to limited departments, The police provide the civil public with services such as passports, traffic, civil registry, judicial police, civil defence, fishing guard and other services s Counter-Terrorism Department , while the military component of the Counter-Terrorism Department is limited to the nature of its functions. The police are not of a combat nature, which applies to the Sudans State security services, the General Intelligence Service.

This information must be installed first, as an important illustrative entry point for those who are absent. With this characterization, our conversation about a military civilian will go directly to the most prominent side of this equation, the military institution at the state level. When we look for the other side of the equation, we find it not at the state level but at the level of the government authority. This necessarily leads us to the question of the nature of the State and whether the State can be military, civilian or religious. It is my appreciation that the State, as long as its institutions are based on the service of the public, are civil, in order to transfer this directly to the second level, namely the authority and governance that administers and directs these institutions according to their direction and is governed by the Constitution, which regulates the relations between the various authorities of the system of government as well as their relationship with the public. They fall within the framework of the policy, which is considered to be a civic practice and exercised by forces and parties classified as civil society systems. The system of government is a monarchy in which power is limited to the royal family or a republican one-party-dictatorship-or several-party-democracy.

This suggests that the military institution is one of the organs of the civilian State with functions defined in nature and under the Constitution governing the authorities governing the State. So where is the location of a military civilian who is trying to drown us in Jeddah and distract us from our objectives by blocking the way for all who are trying to hire the state organs for the disadvantage of the homeland and citizen and realize our great dreams of establishing a State for all Sudanese?

The beginning of politicians relationship with the military

Political developments in the early years after the English colonization of the Sudan witnessed the first phenomenon of politicians relationship with the military. That relationship resulted in the first organized revolt against the colonizer, the 1924 Revolution, which was led by politicians of the White Brigade Association, including Obaid Haj al-Amin, and military personnel serving in the Egyptian police and joined the White Brigade Association. One of the repercussions of the colonizations strike on this revolution was the strangulation of politicians and the removal of Egyptian influence on Sudanese military forces by the establishment of the Sudan Defence Force. With the establishment of that system, Sudanese forces have come to serve the colonial military objectives and participated in several World War II battles for the British Crown in North Africa and the Horn of Africa.

After the British colony left the country behind state institutions that were based on the service of its policies, including the Sudan Defence Force (Sudan Defence Force), whose name was transformed into the Sudanese Armed Forces. As a result of the Sudanese lack of a well-defined national project leading to the post-colonial period, these institutions continued to operate in accordance with British regimes and the senior positions held by English administrators and military personnel were blackened.

Of course, after the establishment of the Sudan Defence Force, Sudanese officers and soldiers had their relations with politicians and political parties that began to come to the surface strongly after the graduate conference. This is legitimate at the time as part of Sudans combined efforts to confront the colonizer, but among its legacies of colonialism, political parties have inherited their advocates of officers and soldiers in the military, while failing to make a permanent constitution governing the relationship between State institutions, power and the citizen. This is the gap from which politicians have been implementing into the corridors of the military establishment through its elements, while for 67 years the Sudan has been governed by temporary constitutions following any military coup d état or peoples revolution.

General Abbouds term in office

With a glimpse of the scenes of national rule since independence, 65 years of which 52 years have been ruled by the name of the military, which has created this controversy, besieged the field of conflict and determined its nature depending on each partys costume. However, the reality of the matter is completely contrary to reality if we try to read in the name of the military from wider angles. The first military coup d état in the Sudan was carried out by a politician, the late Emirati Abdullah Khalil, when he handed over the power he brought to democracy, to the high command of the armed forces led by Lieutenant General Ibrahim Aboud. Abdullah Khalil is a graduate of the engineering department at Gardon College and then joined the army and returned to the political box after he removed his uniform as the Umma Partys most prominent founder to become prime minister in the first national government following independence.

Although that period could be regarded as exclusively military rule, by the very nature of things, the military is unable to administer government in the country, in any country, because its functions are essentially combative and the administration of government is a civilian matter in which the institution plays its role, and this has nothing to do with its graduates and capabilities, but with the nature of its functions. The graduates of this institution are primarily citizens, with the rights and duties of the citizen, which do not exceed or diminish, including the exercise of politics and entry into the institution once the institution has left and reached the highest ranks of authority without taking care of the institution.

This is what happened during the first military rule, so after the expiration of military marches and sitting on the gentlemen of government, thought begins to be given to civilian and service tasks unrelated to the military. The search for forces supporting the functioning of the State Wheel, from civilian ministers and a central council, begins. Military laws cannot do so even under emergency provisions. s relationship with each other and with the weapon so that there is no chaos.

Nimiri and blatant political interference

The most obvious scene of the recruitment and controversy of a civilian-military conflict was in the coup d état of 25 May 1969, a political coup d état with distinction rather than military, even though the military institution was used in its first statement in its name. It is a civilian fact, albeit in uniform. The General Command of the Armed Forces did not carry out a military coup d état against the then elected democratic Government, but rather a group of officers from the military establishment with a political background and here the Persian ground. While the November 1958 coup d état led by Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud appeared to be in the general appearance of the military, despite the extradition process in question, it was the General Command of the armed forces, regardless of the aftermath and the ramifications of the nature of the civilian State and the conditions of its administration, which were incompatible with the nature of the military establishment. Just the opposite came the coup d état of May 1969, politically wearing a uniform and impersonating the name of the armed forces.

By dismantling the Mayan landscape, we will clearly find the roots of the controversy surrounding civilian military solutions. The pre-coup scene is based on several facts, highlighting the fact that political parties penetrated the armed forces by recruiting and bringing into their ranks some officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, a breakthrough that is not the birth of the moment and is not linked to real-time political conditions, but with prior thought of seizing power. Besides the tendency of some non-recruited officers, who entered the war college possessing a balance of student political activity, to take political action in their military uniform motivated by the distortions of the democratic practice of that period, and gathered within the military institution under the name of free officers, which would include even party recruits later, and was influenced by the Egyptian experience. The second reality is the civil war and its repercussions on the countrys military political landscape, albeit in the south.

The third fact is that political parties and individuals planned to carry out the coup d état, and when I say political parties this necessarily includes the group of military members occupying their functions and functions within the armed forces. The fourth fact is that the military with which the parties or those who have joined the Free Officers organizations have been infiltrated are the hands that politicians have tampered with in the corridors of the military to carry out their programmes and visions with the barrel of the gun instead of the ballot box.

After the coup d état, the details of the scene were sufficient to confirm that what took place was a political, not a military, coup d état. Those who carried out the coup d état from the intermediate ranks of the army, according to military hierarchy in order not to disrupt the internal military systems based on these hierarchies, which would create chaos that would have a direct impact on seizure and linkage and a loss of control over the armed forces. Another snapshot of the spectacle is the vast political struggle inherent in the inner corridors of the Mayoist regime, which resulted in bloodbaths here and there, until the regime influenced the formation of its political party Socialist Union, an idea that certainly belongs not to the military but to the imperatives of governance and the nature of a civilian State that the regimes are unable to administer and contain exclusive military systems and laws. The Mayan regime fluctuated from the far left to the far right, but the military was the instrument within which politics was concealed, making it a constant wall of repulsion to the publics aspirations and hopes.

Coup d état 30 June

This is what can be said about the coup d état of June 30, 1989 led by Brigadier General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the rescue regime, not only blatantly but more and more than the coup regime preceded by May. The 30 June coup d état is the Islamic movements coup d état on third democracy And it can be said that what the Islamic Movement did in the military is what drove the relationship between it and the masses to something like a rupture, Since the third days of democracy, the movement had prepared for its coup d état by approaching the Zulfi army. s Republic of Korea , which began its breakthrough from reconciliation with the Mayoist regime in the second half of the 1970s to days before its fall in April 1985.

In addition, the Mayo regimes curriculum vitae and its use of the armed forces as cover for a political programme The Islamic Movement has committed several preachers against the military in an attempt to weaken its strength as a coherent centre of gravity by discharging its functions from its contents. She went against the wall with all the laws governing her work, starting with her excessive orderly hierarchy contract, which regulates her rhythm by assuming lower ranks and intermediary responsibilities greater than their customary tasks. In fact, a major in the army could head a brigade or even a team by virtue of his membership of the Islamic Organization and his proximity to his political leaders. In addition, the Islamic Movement seeks to establish parallel forces of the army based on a far-from-nationalist doctrine and on financial and service privileges that exceed the privileges of members of the armed forces in order to serve the Movements political and security purposes, such as popular defence and multiple security agencies in the various sectors that have transformed them into combat units to ensure their loyalty.

In addition, it invested in the structure of the military to distract the army from its constitutional functions and extended the control of Islamists loyal to the army over its economic institutions and the use of a stick and carrot policy for non-loyalists, after it dismissed and displaced thousands of officers, non-commissioned officers and non-questionable soldiers after the successful coup d état to power in the name of the armed forces. All of this is for fear of being bitten by the same terrier that learns his fiancés but does not guarantee its full control over him because of the presence of many army members who believe in his faith, the need to preserve his professionalism and professionalism, and the very nature of the military establishment that will eventually impose its internal laws at some point.

Summary

What Sudanese suffer at this stage is the result of politicians failure to adhere to the rules of the democratic game and to resort to the military as an old legacy in order to weigh the balance in favour of one side against the other. This has naturally led to the militarys preoccupation with issues that are not relevant to its functions, but rather the creation within it of a class of military who try to transform the institution into an independent political and economic body not subject to the already absent Constitution, at least or a governing institution of the State that alternates in civilian or military uniform where necessary.

The absence of a national project brought together by the Sudanese has created a political vacuum, the effects of which have been extended since the countrys independence. In addition to the loss of political will, which has remained an inherent feature of all periods of national rule, to agree on a permanent constitution that defines and governs the relationship between the institutions of the State and its military, leaving the country to loot protests, internal wars and military political adventures and leaving the rope of the countrys rule on the boat of provisional constitutions formulated and separated from anyone who ascends to rule in any way.