Sudan: Whats preventing the resumption of negotiations between the army and the Rapid Support Forces?
By Youssef Hamad
After six months of conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces over power, observers have confirmed what has been evident since the early moments of the first war, which is that the military confrontations erupting between them in the capital Khartoum will not end in a clear victory, no matter how long it lasts. In reality, Sudanese politicians have a history of losing confrontational stubbornness.
Perhaps what distinguishes the current war is that both sides have declared their desire for negotiations. Indeed, negotiations efforts began last May in the Saudi city of Jeddah and were provided with balanced political sponsorship. However, they stalled, with both sides maintaining their positions. Interest in pushing the parties to resume negotiations waned, and news about them dwindled in the media.
Prior to that, negotiations in Jeddah lacked sufficient seriousness, and their initial rounds ended in an expected failure, failing to achieve even minimal success in securing a ceasefire to help the safe evacuation of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid to affected areas.
Despite the apparent commitment to the necessity of negotiations, both parties continue to hesitate about resuming without providing compelling reasons to the public for the continuation of the destructive conflict in the country. They have left the matter to the discretion or speculations of political analysts and political analysis.
In reality, it does not appear that the two parties, the army and the Rapid Support Forces, are acting independently in this war. They seem to be mere agents for other influential actors who have the final say on whether to engage in negotiations or not. However, this hidden hand can still be pointed out, both internally and externally.
In fact, for the contenders, ruling Sudan means controlling economic resources through the state apparatus. Hence, their violence can be interpreted as driven by their interests, with each of them hinting at the possibility of forming a caretaker government in their respective areas of control.
Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding the negotiation agenda may have contributed to the reluctance of the prominent adversaries in the conflict, the army commander and the Rapid Support Forces commander. It does not appear that either of them has received sufficient guarantees regarding their fate and future beyond the negotiations. In reality, genuine negotiations imply an immediate cessation of war and their joint exit from politics.
