More Than a Memo from the Pensioners of the Armed Forces
Abdullah Rizk Abusimaza
While the military interventions in public affairs, through memos, from the memo of Lieutenant Ali Abdul Latif a hundred years ago, to the famous army memo in the second democracy, can be considered a normal matter, the popular imagination has always confined the role of military personnel, whether in service or pensioners, during crises, to limited and divergent expectations.
The importance of the memo from the army pensioners lies in its issuance from a group that belongs to the armed forces, and its approach to dealing with the April 15 crisis is based on military knowledge and experience gained through many years of work within the armed forces, at the highest levels. This group of people forms a professional reference in their field of specialization, giving their opinions greater weight and qualitative significance.
The memos issuance, which was delivered to General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and to General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, coincided with the approach of the wars sixth month without a decisive resolution. It seemed that its continuation for another month or six months no longer had any meaning other than confirming its futility, for which the citizens are paying the price in terms of killing and displacement. This also coincided with the exposure of the Islamists relationship with the war and their involvement of the army in it.
This memo is the first of its kind in at least the past five years. It is characterized by embodying an approach that is different from the thinking and behavior of traditional military coups. It leans towards brainstorming and objective analysis of the crisis.
That is why the memo was the result of broad discussions that lasted for more than a month, according to some participants, until it was finalized in late September. It was attended by dozens of retired officers from various ranks, whose motives and patriotism, and deep loyalty to the military institution, cannot be doubted or disparaged. They thus form a qualitative addition to the forces of the broad front opposing the war.
The memo may not only express the position of the retired officers who participated in its preparation, and this is one of its important aspects. It may go beyond them to others who are retired or still in service, when it leans towards forming a public opinion among the armed forces regarding the position on the war.
The memo supports the widespread demand to stop the war from a technical standpoint after it has been issued by various political, social, and civil forces based on political, economic, and humanitarian reasons. This is based on a conviction formed by discussions among the retired officers, according to one of the participants: The conflict cannot be resolved militarily based on the facts on the ground. The only way to end it is through a permanent ceasefire, followed by military-military, military-political, and political-political dialogues between all components and entities of the Sudanese people to address the root causes and reasons behind the war syndrome that has been burdening the country since independence.
Therefore, the memo contributes to exposing the advocates of war, revealing their isolation and the futility of their logic, and enhancing efforts to stop the war.
The memo establishes a complementary role that retired officers can play in mediating between the parties to the war to reach a ceasefire agreement and in preparing for the military-military dialogue proposed by the memo, as part of multi-party dialogues to find a settlement to the conflict.
