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Sudan War: Beyond the Secrecy of Jeddah Negotiations and Beyond
Mariam Abbasher
In secrecy peppered with some leaks, the third round of Jeddah negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is underway, following a hiatus of over three months. This pause saw several Sudanese cities experiencing violent clashes between the two sides, which resulted in thousands of civilian lives lost and forced more than two-thirds of the population of the capital Khartoum to flee their homes.
Before the resumption of this round, regional and international political and diplomatic efforts were made to push both parties back to the negotiating table after neither side achieved a military victory. During this break, meetings of the IGAD organization were held, and another meeting of a group of Sudans neighboring countries, both of which generally endorsed the Jeddah platform for negotiations.
Additionally, the efforts of the national political forces, in all their classifications within and outside Sudan, aimed to reach a ceasefire, stop human rights violations, and form a "wide civilian front" to oppose the war, which has already started its activities from the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
Based on the objectives of the December 2018 revolution, the revolutionary forces supporting the civil democratic transition and the return of the army to its fundamental duties, intensified their external movements to urge the regional and international community to pressure both sides to end the conflict.
According to expectations, the chances of signing a long-term ceasefire agreement and opening safe passages for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected people are the most likely scenarios to be achieved during this round of negotiations.
For Ambassador Ibrahim Taha Ayoub, the acceptance to resume dialogue came after the weakening of the military strength and morale of the combatants. He stated that the Armed Forces lost their prestige, their decision-making was eroded, and the leadership almost distanced itself from its base by succumbing to the leadership of the dissolved National Congress Party after the December revolution.
He added that the Armed Forces see the Jeddah platform as their salvation from deterioration and internal conflicts, and perhaps a dream of returning to power, even through alliances once again. Additionally, the negotiations will relieve them from the pressures exerted on them by some external allies.
Ambassador Ibrahim Taha Ayoub also points out that the Rapid Support Forces have also been exhausted and their weapons, especially the modern ones, have been depleted. This is in addition to the blockade imposed on the smuggling of new weapons through the exposed outlets of the Armed Forces, such as the Libyan crossing or the Chad and Central Africa outlets.
Ayoub continued, stating that one of the important factors forcing the Rapid Support Forces to accept and even welcome the Jeddah negotiations is the Sudanese peoples rejection and enmity towards them since the early days, and their demands for its dissolution. Additionally, time does not seem to be in their favor, and any extension of their control over the areas they have taken over will inevitably scatter their efforts to maintain these new regions.
In contrast, some leaders of the Rapid Support Forces see the limitation of important decision-making, including military, political, and financial decisions, to the hands of the "Al Dagalo" family as a disregard for them. They might even demand, before military operations, their legitimate right to participate in decision-making.
Ayoub points out that the third category in the war consists of the remnants of the defunct Salvation regime, who are not concerned with what is happening in Jeddah. Their allies in the army have set out to negotiate despite their opposition to stopping the war. He notes that the old coup plotters are convinced, and rightly so, that there is no return for them to power if the guns fall silent and the peace they do not want comes. Their hope for survival on the ground lies in the failure of the Jeddah negotiations and that the country does not experience any ceasefire.
Ayoub believes that the outcomes of the Jeddah platform will depend, in addition to the publics rejection of the war, on imposing more regional and international pressures and denouncing and boycotting all the leaders who refuse peace. This has already happened to Abdel Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, the second commander of the Rapid Support Forces, and Ali Ahmed Karti, the first leader of the Muslim Brotherhood organization.
In this regard, Ayoub sees it as necessary to ask some countries to refrain from interfering in Sudans internal affairs and that the mediators, Saudi Arabia and the United States, do not become frustrated with the bickering of the two warring parties.
The launch of a new round of negotiations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Armed Forces, after a nearly three-month hiatus, represents a significant turning point in the course of the war as it enters its sixth month. Media expert, Abdullah Rizk, believes that this round could herald the beginning of the countdown to the end of the war. It also signals, in the context of the competing platforms of Addis Ababa and Jeddah, a move towards achieving peace, raising the possibility of stopping the war before the completion of the opposing front in its conference scheduled for next November.
Rizk considers the Armed Forces response to the call to resume negotiations an important event in itself, which could once again allow for the anticipation of an imminent end to the war. He continues, "This response, although delayed for months during which citizens suffered the horrors of war, deserves praise and appreciation as a correct step that leans towards the interests of the nation and its citizens.
On the other hand, it reflects the liberation of military decision-making from the influence of the Islamists, who were toppled by the revolution, ignited the war, and dragged the Armed Forces into it, insisting on its continuation until all blood is shed."
Rizk adds that the round may seem challenging at first glance, but its difficulties can be overcome if both parties have good intentions and strictly and finally commit to the negotiation option, renounce war and combat, and are willing to make mutual concessions to reach an agreement to stop the firing and end hostilities.
Rizk expects a subsequent round to focus on the political side and the arrangements for restoring the democratic transition process led by civilians and the participation of political and civil forces, which may be represented by the nascent civilian front opposing the war.
He believes that one of the most important requirements of the agreement is the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from residential areas, but it is the most popular due to its connection to the return of the displaced, the homeless, and the refugees to their homes and the normalization of public life once again. However, this most pressing demand is not isolated from the overall measures related to the ceasefire on all fronts and theaters of operations, the deployment of a likely American/Saudi team to monitor it, alongside neutral