Sudans War: Democracy as a Pawn and a Victim!
Khalid Taha
(276) days and nights of continuous horror and destruction separated Saturday, April 15, 2023, and Monday, January 15, 2024, as the war between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces militia entered its tenth month. This war, which employed all kinds of deadly weapons, was characterized by military unprofessionalism and a lack of ethics. It finally revealed itself as nothing more than a power struggle, despite the horrific cost. With various terms such as mobilization and enlistment (tribal mobilization or popular resistance), the Sudanese civil war has become a harsh reality.
Efforts and initiatives to end the war have been numerous, but all were overshadowed by the conditions set by mediators and became hostage to military assessments that proved inaccurate from the start. Amidst this complexity, advocating for democracy has become a slogan raised by all warlords, attempting to appeal to international support and win over the domestic audience. While Sudans war seemed on the verge of turning into a proxy battleground for regional and international powers, there is a growing concern it might slide into an abyss, turning Sudan into an arena for international interest conflicts and subjecting its people to unnecessary death.
Biased Civilians
Sudanese civilian forces have been slow to raise their voices calling for an end to the war, mainly due to empty alignments with or against the conflicting parties. Initially, they relied on a swift military resolution, and when they finally spoke up, it was not without bias. Consequently, civil initiatives were deficient, categorized, and ineffective in imposing the will to stop the war. They even widened the gap between the parties. Some civil forces rejected these proposals, stating they did not originate from a genuine commitment to the Sudanese revolution and the civilians who were forced to pay the price of the war. Some political powers saw it as an opportunity to advance political projects under the guise of supporting the democratic transition, deepening the regional and international facilitation of the war under the pretext of halting it.
A strange aspect of Sudans war is the mysterious restraint of the Rapid Support Forces from seizing more areas, despite dominating around 12 out of 18 Sudanese states. This is despite their military superiority, external support, and diplomatic, political, and media backing. They continued to advocate for negotiations with their civilian allies, fearing the loss of legitimacy and a shift in social support. The political opposition gained ground, revealing alliances that some political forces formed with the militia, claiming to support the latter for the sake of democratic transition. The same risk applies to the other side, where Islamic movement affiliates align themselves with the army, sometimes in front of it—with differences in power and violation practices. The scene is brought closer by the former Sudanese Prime Minister Amjad Fareeds statement to Al-Hadath channel, where he said, "Islamists are trying to politically benefit from this war by siding with one of its parties, just as the Forces for Freedom and Change attempt to do the same by siding with the other. These are the facts, and anything else is lies."
However, there is a third bloc, encompassing resistance committees, leftist parties, and civil society formations, that sees the parties in the April 15th war seeking to eliminate the forces of the ongoing revolution. They attempt to seize power under the guise of ending the war, either by success or through an agreement, especially if external pressure on the parties increases due to the widening impact of the war on neighboring countries. Therefore, they advocate against calls for arming any of the parties, preventing the transformation of the war into a comprehensive civil conflict, and opposing any agreement that would bring back the war parties and their supporters to the seat of power.
Unity or Comprehensive Approach
Despite the vast distances between civil forces, calls for the unification of the civil movement persist amid ongoing polarization and setting conditions. While the democratic coordination "Taqadom," which includes the Central Council of Forces for Freedom and Change, and is close to the Rapid Support Forces, has launched what it describes as a roadmap for the next phase, emphasizing openness to all opinions, its divided platform, allied with the Islamic stream "Forces for Freedom and Change Democratic Bloc," insists on the necessity of Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue without foreign involvement. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Communist Party states that the unity of revolutionary forces has become more urgent and conducted discussions with various revolutionary forces. On another front, the Resistance Committees and civil forces signing the "Revolutionary Charter for Establishing Peoples Authority" argue that one condition for unity is the presence of non-opportunistic revolutionary civilian elements looking at issues from a non-partisan national perspective. Despite these wide-ranging differences within current alignments, some political, civil, and professional forces left the Forces for Freedom and Change coalition after overthrowing General Bashirs regime, forming a new alliance called the "Forces for Freedom and Change Democratic Bloc." This alliance supported the October 25, 2021 coup. With a record full of contradictions, each bloc has its vision of unity, based on a unilateral perspective and a tendency toward isolation, making renewed fighting possible with changes in the fighters, especially as some see merely sitting with the other civilian team as a betrayal of the choices of the Sudanese people.
Dignified Discourse
The reality confirms that resolving the Sudanese crisis is connected to addressing its chronic roots, and stopping the bleeding is linked to criminalizing its parties. Dealing with them as active parties in the solution will complicate the scene further, especially for civil forces responsible for not legitimizing the political actors in the war/coup partners. Instead, initiating a unifying national project is crucial. This is the discourse befitting civil and political forces, and only through it can they unite after rising above animosities, exclusionary tendencies, and individualism.
Chronicle of Pain
As the tenth month of the Sudanese war approaches, new and overlapping statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reveal a grim reality. The number of displaced individuals in Sudan has exceeded 7.4 million, with 17.7 million facing hunger, 19 million children out of school, and 97,000 suspected cases of cholera. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, stated that they need 350.1 million to carry out their missions in Sudan, including 159.1 million to increase life-saving assistance for conflict-affected populations.
Meanwhile, the head of the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) in Sudan, Mandip Obrayan, emphasized that the conflict in Sudan poses a threat to the health of 24 million children and the future of Sudan and the entire region, leading to a catastrophe that will extend for generations.
The General Coordination of IDP Camps in Darfur Region warned of a deterioration in the humanitarian situation, expressing concerns about the possibility of famine leading to mass deaths. The island of Tuti in the Blue Nile witnessed 100 deaths due to a shortage of medicine since the outbreak of the war. The "Safeguard Sudanese Heritage Initiative" called for an end to the war and the preservation of civilian areas, historical sites, museums, and natural reserves, preventing them from becoming military battlegrounds.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared on January 5th that the conflict in Sudan has resulted in war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, food insecurity, and lack of healthcare. He highlighted the plight of women and girls facing rape and sexual violence amid chaos and impunity.
Militia Escalation
Despite more than five Sudanese states being untouched by the conflict, the Rapid Support Forces militias continue to operate near the borders. The statements of militia leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, during a meeting with the Democratic Forces Coordination "Taqadom" in Addis Ababa, raised concerns as he acknowledged the existence of forces not affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces. These forces joined after tribal mobilization locally known as "Fazaa," and he expressed a lack of control over them, warning of potential clashes with the Rapid Support Forces if they attempt to restrain them from looting.
In light of these complex circumstances, it appears that the breakdown and loss of control have prompted initiatives from the regions not yet affected by war. States in the east and north of Sudan have initiated efforts to reject war, promote peaceful coexistence, and stop hate speech and escalation campaigns. They called for refusing to arm civilians, transforming their regions into safe havens for those fleeing the war, and demanding safe passages for humanitarian aid.
The Sudanese crisis does not seem likely to be resolved peacefully anytime soon. This, coupled with direct military effects on neighboring countries, will bring about additional complexities in the war game with each new day. During a meeting in Port Sudan with the UN Secretary-Generals Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra, Sudans First Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan affirmed his governments commitment to achieving democratic transition and completing a transitional period ending with general elections. However, the war parties insistence on aligning with the democratic transition, despite their role in suppressing it, staging a coup, and waging war, makes the prospect of peaceful negotiations difficult for now.
The Organization of Islamic Movement and the dissolved National Congress Partys role within the war remains a critical factor, with their influential presence within or alongside the military. The end of the war without their victory signifies another defeat for their authoritative and existential project. Accepting peaceful negotiations to end the war becomes extremely challenging for them. It is certain they will not comply with any decision in that direction, even if it leads to arming civilians or internal conflicts, further complicating the armys situation. According to their perspective, the army they built is now at a crossroads, and whether it will remain loyal to the organization or fall apart, blood will be spilled either way.
In the face of these complex dynamics, it seems that aspects of chaos and loss of control have also spurred initiatives from the regions not yet affected by the war, such as the states in the east and north of Sudan. They have launched initiatives to reject the war, promote peaceful coexistence, stop hate speech and escalation campaigns, and defuse ethnic tensions. They called for refusing to arm civilians, transforming their regions into safe havens for those fleeing the war, and demanding safe passages for humanitarian aid. The Sudanese crisis does not seem likely to be resolved peacefully anytime soon. This, coupled with direct military effects on neighboring countries, will bring about additional complexities in the war game with each new day.
