Internet Lifeline Sudan
April 2024, Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Ensuring unhindered internet access is key to helping the Sudanese people survive the war
Starting in the early days of February, a telecommunications shutdown left almost 30 million Sudanese without access to the internet or telephone calls for several weeks.
Although the network has been partially restored in the east of the country, large swathes of Sudan – including the capital Khartoum – remain isolated. The large-scale shutdown in February has come on top of several network disruptions over the previous months, particularly in the western region of Darfur, which have kept millions of people isolated for months. These repeated disruptions have taken place against the backdrop of a violent war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which in their reckless competition for power have dragged the whole country and its 45 million people into an abyss.
Telecommunication shutdowns have a catastrophic impact for the Sudanese people, for whom phone calls and particularly the internet have become a lifeline since the outbreak of the war in April 2023. Far from being simply a tool for communication, in the current circumstances the internet has become a necessary tool for survival, enabling people to avoid armed clashes, procure food and medicines, as well as to transfer and receive money. Internet connectivity also allows the Sudanese diaspora and international aid actors to channel funds into the country, thereby providing life-saving support to millions of people in need, at a time when aid is struggling to reach them.
In this context, all efforts should be made – inside and outside of Sudan – to ensure unhindered access to phone calls and the internet for the Sudanese population.
To this end, this Alert suggests that:
(1) Humanitarian and political negotiations should include unhindered access to the internet as a key priority, given the crucial role that it plays for the population;
(2) Aid actors and donor governments should promote the availability of multiple ways of accessing the internet, such as solutions based on satellite and WiMAX technology, or the use of e-SIMs near the country’s borders;
(3) Any solution to the current crisis should also consider how to increase the resilience of Sudan’s telecom sector in the longer term, for instance by decentralizing its infrastructure and opening up the telecom market to smaller businesses.
The crucial role of the internet in the midst of Sudan’s war
Since the outbreak of the war in April 2023, the internet has been a lifeline for a large share of the Sudanese population – not only in Khartoum and in other urban areas, but also in many rural areas across the country. With armed clashes spreading across Sudan, access to information through the internet has become more critical than ever. The internet allows people to have access to news about their family and friends, and to retain social connections that become all the more important in times of crisis.
In many cases, it can also be a life-saving tool, as people regularly use it to post and receive information about where the fighting takes place or where an attack is impending. The internet is also used to map escape routes towards areas that are less affected by the war, or to share information about the requirements for crossing into neighbouring countries. In addition, people also use the internet to mobilize an active response to the crisis.
This includes, for instance, asking individuals to cater for specific emergencies, e.g. by bringing essential items like medicines to areas where these are most needed. In addition, at the collective level, neighbourhood-based Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) use the internet to share information regarding the availability of basic items such as food and medicines, arrange their procurement, and ensure their distribution to those in need.
Besides granting access to information and communication, the internet also enables access to key public services. The issuing of passports – which are needed for people to leave the country through legal channels – is dependent on internet connectivity in Port Sudan, where SAF-controlled authorities have relocated their offices and servers. Moreover, many children and young people have come to rely on the internet to access the few online education services that are still being provided by UN agencies or by some universities – a particularly precious service in one of the largest education crises in the world, with 20 million children being unable to attend school.
Perhaps most importantly, the internet allows access to financial services, enabling people to receive remittances and to transfer money within the country. Mobile banking applications – most notably the Bank of Khartoum’s bankak, but also other applications such as Faisal Islamic Bank’s Fawry, MTN’s MoMo, Cashi and SyberPay – are widely used by the Sudanese people, including in hard-to-reach areas. These apps allow people to receive money and to pay for basic needs (e.g. food, medicines, fuel), and are widely accepted for payments, even in the informal market.
The internet also represents a key channel for aid actors and donor governments to support Sudan’s population. Avenues to provide such support continue to exist, including for instance the transfer of funds to farmers struggling to pay for the inputs needed to produce food, or to consumers who cannot afford to buy the food that is still available in the market. Mobile money and mobile banking applications provide a way for donors to transfer these funds, but their functioning depends on an operational telecom network, including access to the internet.
Finally, internet access is also crucial for accountability and justice efforts. Brave human rights monitors and activists continue to risk their lives to document the atrocities perpetrated during the war. However, not being able to share these reports in a timely manner with the outside world means that this documentation can be lost. Saving images and videos of abuses on the phone is too risky, as warring parties target those who document their crimes.
Recurring internet shutdowns and their impact
Since April 2023, the war has had a profound impact on Sudan’s telecom sector, which had already been operating for decades in a challenging environment. The war’s impact has varied significantly over time and across regions. Since early on in the war, many areas of the country – particularly in Darfur – have suffered from repeated network disruptions and internet blackouts, at times enduring for months on end. However, across large parts of the country – including Khartoum and centraleastern Sudan – internet services remained available for several months.
This showcased the sector’s resilience, the commitment of local communities and technicians to keep the infrastructure running, and potentially an understanding by the warring parties that telecom services should be preserved, even if only in their own interest. Notably, Sudan’s main data centre in Khartoum, located in a conflict area, experienced no disruption for months. Continued access to the internet in many areas outside of the capital also suggests that technicians were able to carry out maintenance work and supply fuel to network towers, even in the midst of security concerns affecting transport and fuel availability.
Over time, however, Sudan’s generals increasingly weaponized access to the internet.
According to most reports, the large countrywide shutdown in February started when the RSF forced Sudan’s main telecom providers to cut off their services, demanding the restoration of internet access for Darfur. Different theories exist as to whether the network disruptions in Darfur were a result of the conflict or of deliberate sabotage by the SAF. Over time, the network was partially restored – although with limited geographical coverage (mostly in the country’s east) and reduced quality – thanks to the efforts of Sudani engineers, who quickly operationalised a new data centre in Port Sudan. However, internet access remains weak or absent in many areas of the country, including in Khartoum and Al Jazirah.
The impact of the telecom shutdowns has been devastating. In areas without a connection, people cannot be in touch with their families and friends, and hence cannot access any support networks. Unable to use their mobile banking apps, people cannot pay for their basic needs, including food. The shutdowns have also forced many ERRs to halt their activities, thus depriving the population of their only effective providers of food and health assistance. The (already difficult) access to key services was halted, with online education coming to an end, and people unable to obtain their passports until the internet was restored in Port Sudan. Moreover, large-scale atrocities such as those happening in al-Geneina have for a long time been underreported, and the same applies to ongoing atrocities currently taking place in other regions, such as Al Jazirah.
Ensuring unhindered access to the internet
Given the critical, life-saving role that the internet currently plays for the Sudanese population, ensuring unhindered internet access for as many people as possible should be a key priority for all actors – both inside and outside of Sudan.
To this end, this Alert provides the following recommendations:
(1) Prioritize access to the internet as part of any negotiation process Almost one year into the war, there are a multitude of local, regional and international efforts aimed at addressing Sudan’s crisis. In mid- April, France will host a humanitarian conference for Sudan in Paris, while the United States plans to resume direct negotiations between the SAF and the RSF in Jeddah. Earlier rounds of talks in Jeddah have shown that the warring parties’ commitment to ceasefires and humanitarian measures is not credible. Nevertheless, as the country’s humanitarian crisis continues to deteriorate, Sudanese and international actors may be able to effectively pressure the warring parties to abide by a minimum standard of humanitarian commitments.
Negotiation efforts – whether they concern political, military, or humanitarian issues – should put forward the immediate restoration of access to the internet across all regions as a key priority. When pushing for the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid, mediators should include access to the internet in the discussions, reflecting the life-saving role that the internet plays for the population. As the warring parties’ commitments cannot be trusted, mediators should push for concrete actions, such as a complete reversal of any remaining shutdowns and the restoration of damaged telecom infrastructure.
To increase pressure on the warring parties, international actors should explicitly highlight the deliberate internet shutdowns as a denial of humanitarian aid – and hence as a violation of international law, liable to international prosecution. On the other hand, they could frame the restoration of internet access as a way for the warring parties to gain legitimacy among the Sudanese population, as well as towards the international community. Such a commitment would stand in stark contrast to current practices, whereby SAF and especially RSF officers have reportedly profited from the war economy.
(2) Support multiple mechanisms for internet provision, including satellite connection, WiMAX, and e-SIMs
Besides pressuring the warring parties to restore the telecom services under their control, donor governments and aid actors should support the use of multiple ways to access the internet.
These include, for instance, satellite connection, WiMAX technology, and e-SIMs.
Although none of these solutions is perfect by itself, an increased reliance on multiple solutions has major advantages. First of all, diversifying away from the current dependency on Sudatel’s infrastructure (see Box 1) can limit the negative impact of physical damage to such infrastructure – be it as a side-effect of the fighting, or due to active targeting and sabotage. Moreover, relying on different mechanisms can broaden geographical coverage (given that different technologies are available or implementable in different locations), while also pushing down prices (particularly if the number of potential suppliers grows).
In addition, this strategy can also reduce risks related to capture by the warring parties: if the SAF or the RSF shut down one mechanism or gain control thereover, the population may still have other alternatives to rely upon.
Support from international actors could take several forms. For instance, donors could provide financial support to ensure that the costly satellite technology becomes more affordable for the population. This model has already been pioneered in Ukraine, where the US administration has provided equipment and financial support to ensure internet access. While this experience has elicited its fair share of controversies, it could provide useful learning for any potential similar effort in Sudan. Critically, any such effort should be adapted to Sudan’s specific context, accounting for specific risks (e.g. capture by the warring parties) and opportunities (e.g. Sudanese private sector actors already engaged in this sector).
International support for these mechanisms can benefit from cooperation with the Sudanese private sector. As noted earlier, many of these solutions have already been implemented in Sudan, including by Sudanese companies. International actors can provide support for these businesses to enable them to provide access to the internet as widely and as cheaply as possible.
In addition, Sudanese businesses may act as hubs for the distribution of internet access. It is often easier for businesses than it is for private citizens to retain access to the internet – be it through landline connections, which are less subject to damage, or thanks to their ability to pay for and operate alternative technologies (e.g. satellite, WiMAX).
International actors should provide incentives for these businesses to share internet access with the communities around them, wherever possible. This model was used in Khartoum during the 2018-19 protests (some businesses that had retained access to the internet during the shutdowns would open up access to people during certain times, while carefully switching it off when the police would come), and it could be implemented once again – with the necessary adaptations – in the current context.
(3) Build long-term resilience for Sudan’s telecom sector
While the priority in the short term is to deliver internet access for the population, any measures undertaken to this end should also consider how to make Sudan’s telecom sector more resilient against shocks in the long term. Most notably, the current experience during the war (see above) has shown that dependency on centralized infrastructure (e.g. a single, large data centre in Khartoum) exposes the telecom sector to major risks in case of physical damage to such infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, Sudanese and international actors should ride the wave of the current changes in Sudan’s telecom sector and push for a more decentralized infrastructure. This could entail, for instance, building several smaller data centres around the country.
Similar changes should be adopted regarding Sudan’s telecom market. So far, this market has been dominated by a few large companies, with small and medium-sized enterprises often being confined to smaller tasks. By contrast, increasing the role of smaller businesses in the telecom sector may provide several benefits – including not only lower prices for customers (if the number of suppliers increases), but also more resilience towards shocks (in case one supplier is not able to deliver its services, others may step in to replace it).
As Sudan’s humanitarian crisis continues to deteriorate, no stone should be left unturned to ensure that the population has access to basic needs, such as food, healthcare, and a safe environment. In today’s Sudan, access to these needs largely depends on access to the internet – making it a lifeline that demands immediate restoration, while also keeping in mind the longer-term needs of a post-war Sudan.
About the Clingendael Institute
Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world.
