Sudan’s Civil War and the Future of Information Warfare

Introduction
In 2019, long-standing Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted in favour of a civilian-oriented transition government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Though some were hopeful that this nascent civilian government would lead to a period of good governance and peace, conflicting priorities between civilian and military leaders threatened internal stability. These tensions mounted until 2021 when Hamdok was removed from office and power was then split between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. While the SAF is the official military of the Sudanese government, the RSF is a separate paramilitary group that previously partnered with the SAF to engage in combat operations. While the priorities of al-Burhan and Hemedti historically had aligned, this power dynamic highlighted their disagreements and augured armed conflict between the SAF and RSF, leading to the outbreak of the Sudanese Civil War in 2023. This civil war has led to one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent decades, and it also demonstrates a shift in focus to a n emerging theatre of combat: information warfare. Though information warfare has always been an important, yet auxiliary, function of war, Sudan’s unique situation allows insight towards what future conflicts may look like when the information warfare theatre becomes a primary focus.

A 2017 Freedom House study found that only 30.9% of Sudanese citizens had internet access, and damage to telecommunications infrastructure, paired with the large-scale loss of economic stability since the start of the war, has no doubt caused this number to plummet. If most Sudanese citizens do not have internet access, then it may seem odd that the Sudanese Civil War is rife with such concentrated online disinformation campaigns. Despite this, both the SAF and the RSF have exercised large-scale online disinformation campaigns for over a decade. This can be partially attributed to Sudan’s historic ties with Russia; leaked communications illustrate Russian specialists training Sudanese personnel on using disinformation to promote the state’s agenda. While Russian disinformation tactics have been well documented elsewhere, what makes the Sudanese Civil War unique is that both sides were trained by Russian disinformation agents. The dire situation in Sudan has also led to a decrease in subtlety compared to other modern campaigns, allowing this conflict to yield greater insight on both Russian disinformation tactics themselves and how these tactics can syncretize into other states’ national doctrines.

Initial disinformation operations only reach a minority of Sudan’s population, but these campaigns are often successful since the disinformation is designed to spread offline in the form of rumours. Additionally, a demonstrated history of internet shutdowns allows the internet to be a valve that the RSF and SAF can turn to control when information is available. These rumours act as the primary source of news in the country, as all domestic media organizations were dissolved, and foreign journalists have been heavily restricted in recent years. The chaos of war mixed with the lack of reputable sources leaves the average Sudanese citizen to consult the respective X (formerly Twitter) accounts of the SAF and the RSF for information on current events. While it may seem unprofessional for these organizations to use X instead of an official government news outlet, the usage of these platforms allows disinformation campaigns to pervade an individual’s daily life, since citizens will view targeted content even when they are using social media for personal purposes.

A History of Disinformation in Sudan
Even though the SAF and RSF are doctrinally opposed to one another, their disinformation strategies today are remarkably similar and reveal a continuity of their strategies from the al-Bashir era. During the al-Bashir era, the SAF and the RSF worked in tandem to infiltrate anti-government Telegram groups and arrest protestors. In accordance with Russian advice, the Sudanese government would amplify news on the arrests of these protestors to “make an example” out of them, using information campaigns as a tool to project governmental authority. The Sudanese government also created fake anti-government groups to organize “protests,” only to arrest all the protestors once they arrived. During the al-Bashir era, Sudanese agents would also “shadowban” anti-government posters on social media by using bots to mass report their posts for irrelevance and by flooding users’ feeds with unrelated posts using the same hashtags. Even during the al-Bashir era, Sudanese actors were taking advantage of social media algorithms and online information flows to control government opposition.

These methods were left unchanged after al-Bashir was ousted, though disinformation campaigns went from emboldening the government to delegitimizing it as military officials sought to remove Prime Minister Hamdok from power. Military actors fabricated rumours about Hamdok being a “drunkard” and an “atheist,” highlighting a propensity to spread rumours attacking political opponents to turn citizens against them. Leaked communications also revealed plans to plant LGBT pride flags at the protests to associate protestors with homosexuality, a strategy which intensifies discrimination while also enhancing the grip of authoritarianism.

After the 2021 coup, these strategies continued with the RSF and SAF contracting a Canadian PR firm for 6 million CAD to enact a charm offensive towards foreign powers, and then later partnering with an Egyptian firm to employ social media posters in pro-military troll farms. Observers who follow Russian disinformation campaigns should find this tactic very familiar. The military largely owed its primacy in the previous years due to their extensive information campaigns, so when violence erupted between the RSF and SAF, both sides recognized the need to control information flows. The Sudanese Civil War saw two seasoned disinformation forces face against each other, and this led to a severe lapse in subtlety as both organizations sought to overwhelm the narrative of the other.

Information Warfare Tactics and Cases
The disinformation tactics of the SAF and the RSF primarily comprise of the following four strategies:
Taking advantage of social media algorithms to flood netizens with targeted information, all while cutting off access to alternative information sources
Framing a populist “us vs them” narrative where the other side is discredited through fabricated claims while “we” are on the side of a popular/ virtuous ideal (i.e., democracy with the RSF and Islam with the SAF)
Framing a narrative that “we” are winning, and the people are turning against the other side to facilitate a bandwagon effect (even if reports on victories need to be completely fabricated)
Targeting information campaigns towards ordinary citizens of non-combatant countries to compel these countries governments to action

Below are some examples of disinformation campaigns executed by both sides, highlighting the blatant disregard for truth and credibility amidst this war. In April 2023, the SAF claimed to control an important radio broadcast tower in a bid to cause observers to overestimate their strength; this was easily proven wrong via independent reports. Later that month, both the SAF and the RSF simultaneously claimed to control the entire Merowe airport on different social media platforms while it was actually contested. In May 2023, the RSF claimed to control the entirety of Khartoum, while neutral media sources and international observers corroborated that there was prolonged fighting in the city’s urban core well after the post was made. Throughout the war, both sides would spin narratives of the masses protesting the opposing side to give the impression that the people were united against one specific side. It is unknown how many of these stories were completely fabricated, but an obvious example was a prominent SAF-aligned account on X posting a video of “protestors throwing rocks at an RSF truck,” despite the same video being circulated during the 2019 protests – well before the war. Towards the beginning of the war, the SAF created an X account with the handle “@RSFSudann” and purchased a blue checkmark along with over 25,000 bot followers. After getting “verified,” this account falsely claimed that RSF leader Hemedti had died. This campaign was instigated to sow confusion among the RSF’s supporters. In October 2023, an AI-generated audio clip of Omar al-Bashir criticizing SAF leader al-Burhan began circulating social media to cause al-Bashir supporters who were now supporting the SAF to renege on their views. While it is uncertain where this clip came from, it was likely created by either the RSF or an actor aligned with the RSF. This incident marks one of the first documented cases of generative AI being used as a weapon of war.

In addition to blatantly false content, recent posts surrounding X accounts of the SAF and the RSF illustrate the narratives they seek to push via misleading information. For example, nearly every post from the RSF includes the hashtags معركة_الديمقراطية# (Battle for Democracy) and حراس_الثورة_المجيدة# (Guardians of the Glorious Revolution) (1, 2, 3). This fits with the rest of their posts, which commonly characterize the RSF as “pro-democratic” and “anti-oppression,” while associating the SAF with al-Bashir’s kleptocratic regime. These terms mirror anti-colonialist terminology from the 1956 revolution but are questionable considering allegations of the RSF’s disregard for the rule of law and human rights. Another example is a “media release” hosted on the RSF’s X account which lambasts the SAF for ethnic cleansing, despite the RSF’s origin from the Janjaweed militia (i.e., the militia accused of committing most of the genocides in Darfur). In June of 2024, the RSF published a post framing a narrative that they were donating ambulances to local hospitals and acting as the “hospitals’ guardians” mere days after RSF soldiers were accused of committing war crimes by opening fire on medical personnel at a hospital, highlighting the state of projection in RSF propaganda.

Meanwhile, the SAF’s X account has largely co-opted religious terminology into its posts, claiming the RSF to be infidels and claiming to have “the support of God.” This trend is continued as the SAF specifically uses the word شهداء to refer to their dead, meaning martyrs in a religious sense. The usage of this term fits squarely in the SAF’s narrative, appealing to Sudan’s highly religious population. The SAF’s self-framing as “the side of Islam” combined with their current desperation, has allowed Islamic extremists to spread rapidly among their ranks. Meanwhile, SAF aid from Iran has led to observers indicating a shift towards radical Islamism in their governmental doctrine (despite Sudan’s status as a majority Sunni nation). These concerns are nothing new, considering the government of Sudan’s past as a sponsor of terrorism and the past regime’s creation of the SAF-aligned “Cyber Jihad Unit” at the beginning of their disinformation campaigns.

While both sides of the war engage in heavy domestic disinformation campaigns, the RSF has been unique in expanding their reach internationally. Hemedti has gone on an international charm offensive by visiting leaders of surrounding nations to establish himself as the “legitimate” leader of Sudan, including meeting the former civilian leader Hamdok. Meanwhile on X, the RSF repeats most of their posts in English, no doubt to reach an international audience and appear as the “legitimate” source of information on events in Sudan to outside observers. While PR efforts to gain legitimacy are nothing new to leaders amid a civil war, what makes these efforts unique is that they are targeted at common citizens of other countries (e.g., UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia). The Sudanese Civil War already has an international reach due to SAF support from Egypt and Iran as well as thinly veiled RSF support from the UAE, but international disinformation campaigns from the RSF appear to implicate these countries more as active participants in the war.

The state of information warfare in Sudan has led to a desert of reliable information as Sudanese citizens are forced to place trust in sources of dubious accuracy. As the SAF and RSF seek to overwhelm the other with their narratives, there is a stark difference between current events amidst the civil war and the average Sudanese citizen’s knowledge of these events. Western military doctrine has long since professed information operations to be a force multiplier, but as political events in Sudan are entirely tied to information warfare campaigns, it has emerged as its own dedicated theatre.

Disinformation Campaigns Beyond Sudan
According to a report by the Africa Center, disinformation campaigns in Africa are not only ubiquitous throughout the continent but have quadrupled since 2022. This report also highlights the growth of domestic disinformation campaigns propagated throughout Africa, revealing that Sudan is not alone among autocratic regimes employing online disinformation campaigns. Additionally, one can observe the exact same disinformation tactics being used by Russia in Africa, such as algorithm manipulation (strategy #1) in the Central African Republic and targeting non-combatant country citizens (strategy #4) with Niger. Russia’s active disinformation campaigns extend to Sudan as well, where Russia likely seeks to take advantage of the country’s mineral reserves. These competing information campaigns cause Russian-inspired Sudanese disinformation campaigns to occasionally clash with Russian disinformation campaigns, building more confusion in an already opaque conflict. Furthermore, in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, all four of these strategies are being actively employed by Russian disinformation agents as they seek to destabilize target nations and lessen aid to Ukraine (1, 2, 3, 4).

Russia is not the only purveyor of conflict-driven disinformation campaigns, as Chinese operations flood Western social media too (even though these platforms are often banned in China). Examples of Chinese disinformation campaigns include a deluge of fabricated content which misrepresent typical living conditions via Western sock puppets to form a narrative that living conditions in China are superior. Moreover, these disinformation campaigns cover topics such as Chinese activities in the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Chinese disinformation campaigns also can be found reaching Africa, such as in Zimbabwe where Chinese funds have reportedly permeated the ruling party so deep that politicians in Zimbabwe frequently parrot Chinese talking points. More evidence of China attempting to control information flows includes a case of a Zimbabwean newspaper publishing a slew of articles exposing Chinese human rights abuses, only for Chinese officials to use their political and economic leverage to get these articles retracted. Chinese-sponsored media would then go on to claim that these articles were written by a “puppet sponsored and manipulated by the US embassy to attack Chinese investment”. Disinformation campaigns were also found by actors such as the United Arab Emirates, amidst smear campaigns against prominent critics of the nation. While this article has discussed disinformation campaigns from governments in Sudan, Russia, China, the CAR, Niger, and the UAE, it must be stressed that disinformation is a widespread issue that permeates autocratic regimes all across the globe, and it is currently growing in its reach. Democracies have also been accused of similar activities, such as recent reports that the US conducted a disinformation campaign in the Philippines to undermine confidence in Chinese COVID vaccines, further highlighting the growing impact of information warfare.

The Future of Information Warfare
The ubiquity of modern-day information warfare campaigns reveals a trend of how conflict is evolving. As developing nations develop technologically faster than they develop politically, greater levels of internet penetration among a population renders internet-based information warfare campaigns more effective. Being trained directly by Russian specialists, the SAF and the RSF have been able to adopt information warfare strategies quicker than other governments, but these campaigns go beyond Russia. The Sudanese Civil War is not isolated but is instead a look into the future of warfare between actors which take advantage of the modern information ecosystem. The impersonation of opposing sides’ media to discredit them, the widespread circulation of stories on victories which never occurred, the usage of generative AI to fabricate misleading “evidence” – these are all already staples of the war in Sudan, as well as other conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. These strategies are poised to continue to spread to other conflicts. While this article does not argue that every future conflict will become a war of clashing false narratives, the role of disinformation in armed conflicts will certainly become more pronounced as sophisticated methods of disinformation creation and dissemination integrate further into national strategies.

Current trends surrounding information warfare campaigns at the domestic, international, and global levels paint a worrying picture of how it may evolve. In the case of Sudan, one can see the following trends start to manifest:

A switch from traditional journalistic sources to social media for a country’s news, bolstered by heavy press restrictions, to allow disinformation to permeate an individual’s daily life
The proliferation of “bandwagoning” troll farms, particularly with the use of trained Large Language Models
The targeting of citizens of non-combatant countries to shape foreign policy in favour of an individual side

Conclusion
The ongoing information war carries a heavy human toll. Humanitarian and aid workers currently struggle to deliver assistance to the people of Sudan because of the opaque information landscape, further exacerbating the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the 2024 U.S. Directorate of National Intelligence Annual Threat Analysis warned that amid the current information blackout in Sudan, terrorist and criminal organizations can operate more easily as law enforcement entities would face greater difficulty in tracking these organizations. If these trends continue, then the rise of disinformation may be concomitant to a rise in organized crime and terrorism. As the state of information warfare changes, so should nations which are often targets. It is imperative that nations such as the United States, United Kingdom, and those in the European Union build trust in official information sources among constituents through community engagement and to educate citizens on ongoing disinformation campaigns from hostile actors. The disinformation plague afflicting Sudan is a glance at the emerging reality of information warfare and calls for targets of disinformation campaigns to fortify further against them.

Source: https://encyclopediageopolitica.com/2024/06/28/sudans-civil-war-and-the-future-of-information-warfare/