A Government-in-Exile: A Liability or an Asset in Sudan’s War?
Khalid Massa
In the midst of the devastating April war that ravaged Sudans lush greenery and drylands alike, everyone drowning in its chaos clings to any hope, however fragile, for salvation—whether from a nearby ally within Sudan or the distant promises of neighboring countries and the international community. These aspirations have recently turned toward the movement led by the Taqaddam Coordinating Committee of Civil Democratic Forces, which announced a meeting in early December in Entebbe, Uganda, to discuss various agendas related to the crisis imposed by the war on the Sudanese people.
The stated goal of rejecting the war, working to end it, and addressing its impact on the Sudanese people forms the core of the public rhetoric of Taqaddam’s leaders, including former Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdok and the committee’s spokespersons. The Declaration of Principles, announced and signed in Addis Ababa, largely adhered to this initial stance against the war. Yet, this initiative failed to achieve its intended outcomes, as it became a target for vilification rather than a focus on its substance and efforts to address the crisis.
Beyond the preexisting mistrust toward the civilian coalition by proponents of continued warfare—who reject any ceasefire proposal regardless of its merits—the failure of the initiative and declaration can also be attributed to the lack of thorough planning and haste in its execution. Priority should have been given to rallying broader civilian support for the declaration and persuading potential allies from political and civil forces who may have initially expressed reservations about its wording. Achieving consensus among these forces, many of which agree that war exacerbates rather than resolves Sudan’s crisis, was not an impossible task.
The Entebbe Meeting and the Controversial Proposal
The early December meeting in Entebbe, held by Taqaddam, maintained the overarching priorities of ending the war, opening safe corridors for humanitarian aid, and advocating for civilian protection. However, the “customary politics” of Sudanese alliances surfaced during the meeting. Dr. Al-Hadi Idris, deputy chair of Taqaddam and leader of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, along with Dr. Suleiman Sandal, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, introduced the idea of forming a government-in-exile for discussion as part of the agenda. This proposal was framed as a mechanism to delegitimize the de facto authority of the military regime.
It is essential to note that the concept of a government-in-exile is neither unprecedented nor unfamiliar. Historically, such governments have emerged in response to coups or wars in various political contexts. However, its relevance and feasibility must be critically examined within the unique circumstances of Sudan’s ongoing crisis. Will the formation of a government-in-exile serve as an asset to Taqaddams efforts to end the war, or will it become a liability, undermining those efforts?
The proposal quickly overshadowed the other pressing items on the Entebbe meeting agenda. Despite Dr. Abdalla Hamdok’s attempts to mitigate the internal disputes over the idea by referring it to a newly formed mechanism for further study, the notion risks exacerbating divisions within the civilian political sphere and the broader Sudanese society. Worse, it may bolster pro-war rhetoric by invoking parallels with the Libyan and Yemeni models of fragmentation.
Contextual Challenges and Regional Realities
The idea of a government-in-exile faces numerous obstacles in Sudan’s current context. It risks deepening political divisions and reinforcing narratives that perpetuate the war. During the 2018–2019 revolution, the broad public support for the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and international consensus for change lent significant legitimacy to the revolutionary civilian government. Such widespread backing may not be easily replicated for a government-in-exile, especially given the region’s tentative stance toward Sudan’s current leadership.
While regional bodies like the African Union suspended Sudan’s membership following the October 25 coup, their influence remains limited. Regional actors have shown little appetite for endorsing a government-in-exile, particularly in a war-torn country like Sudan. Similarly, the international community prioritizes pragmatic solutions that align with their interests, often favoring negotiated settlements over decisive action against incumbent regimes.
Prioritizing Unity and Practical Solutions
For Taqaddam, the path forward requires careful prioritization of its agenda to unify the civilian front for an immediate ceasefire, secure humanitarian assistance, and establish safe corridors for aid delivery. The committee must also engage global partners to develop mechanisms for civilian protection and document war crimes without resorting to divisive rhetoric that feeds into the pro-war agenda.
Equally critical is the need to heed the directives of the Entebbe meeting itself by strengthening outreach to forces outside Taqaddam, broadening the coalition’s structures to ensure inclusive representation. The success of the new mechanism in achieving these goals will bolster efforts to end Sudan’s war and address its humanitarian catastrophe.
In a time when Sudan teeters on the edge, unity and deliberate action—not haste or divisive proposals—are the keys to salvaging the country and its people.
