Obstacles to Democratic Transition in Sudan
By Mohammed Ghulamabi
This article provides a general discussion on a range of obstacles hindering the process of transitioning to "peaceful power transfer" or what is commonly referred to as "civil democratic transition." It aims to open the door for fruitful discussions around these challenges without claiming to be exhaustive or providing definitive answers for those seeking to understand the barriers to Sudan’s political growth. This is due to the immense complexities surrounding the transition to a democratic, civilian sphere and sustainable peace.
The article categorizes the obstacles into those related to the nature of the state’s structure, societal challenges, the fragility of democratic civil forces, and the one-party rule, based on classifications derived from political sociology.
The State’s Structure as an Obstacle
One of the key obstacles to democratic transition is the nature of the state’s structure. In Sudan, especially under dictatorial regimes, political authority does not recognize the peoples sovereignty. These regimes assume power through imagined historical privileges as colonial heirs or via military coups. In their constant rise to state leadership, they disregard the public and their right to influence state governance. In such circumstances, it becomes exceedingly difficult for political authority to abandon its guardianship logic and pave the way for a genuinely democratic civilian sphere representing popular will.
Furthermore, the state’s structure does not fundamentally change with the departure of a leader, whether by death or otherwise. A successor typically inherits the predecessors characteristics, policies, and approach. In Sudan’s case, this has manifested in individuals claiming power either through historical entitlement or prolonged military coups that ultimately consolidate the state and its resources in favor of a small elite.
Societal Challenges
Societal factors also serve as significant barriers to democratic transition. Sudanese society is largely influenced by a dominant religious mindset, represented prominently by the various faces of political Islam throughout different political eras. This influence became evident during the first attempts to draft a Sudanese constitution, with lawmakers insisting on defining Sudan as an Arab and Islamic state.
These lawmakers mirrored the characteristics and conditions of Sudan’s population, who have long been trapped in a triad of poverty, ignorance, and disease. Political Islam has exploited this triad by instilling fear of the values associated with modern civil states, such as secularism, freedom, and human rights, portraying them as threats to religious beliefs.
The Fragility of Democratic Civil Forces
When discussing the fragility of democratic civil forces, it is essential to differentiate between internal weaknesses and external pressures. In Sudan, civil political forces have borne the burden of resisting dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, often at the expense of building their organizations on strong, modern foundations.
Conversely, authoritarian regimes have actively sought to undermine the development and modernization of these civil democratic forces, either by co-opting them into their authority or severely repressing those who resist integration or domestication. However, this does not absolve civil political forces from their responsibility to adopt democracy as a genuine political program for social transformation among their bases. They must also build robust, modern structures that meet the aspirations of their members, especially the youth, who are eager for swift and radical change.
The Role of One-Party Rule
The issue of one-party rule as an obstacle to democratic transition requires careful examination. In reality, such regimes often consist of various social factions united by shared interests in political power. For example, we witnessed the split between Hassan al-Turabi and Omar al-Bashir in 1999, the rise of competing factions led by Ali Osman Taha and Nafie Ali Nafie before the December 2018 revolution, and, more recently, the rift between Ahmed Haroun’s and Ali Mahmoud’s factions within the banned National Congress Party, the political arm of the "Islamic Movement," in October 2024.
Therefore, it is more accurate to view these factions, with their shared interests, as a major obstacle to Sudans democratic transition. A prominent faction within the Islamist movement has consistently opposed all attempts at democratic transition, culminating in its role in igniting the ongoing war in Sudan and rejecting all initiatives for peaceful resolution.
This will be the topic of our upcoming article: "The War of April 15: Who Profits from Death?"
