The April War: Britain—The Empire That Lost Its Grip on Sudan
Khalid Massa
Before the April war in Sudan, the United Kingdom (Britain) was fully engaged, politically and diplomatically, in driving the transition process. This was evident even one day before the conflict erupted. Through the so-called "Quad Mechanism," which included the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Britain contributed to the signing of a framework agreement on December 5, 2022—just four months before the war began. The political process was meant to culminate in a comprehensive settlement. However, the first bullet fired on the morning of April 15, 2023, marked the death of both the process and its goals, signaling Britain’s figurative sunset over Sudan.
Examining the trajectory of international diplomacy in recent decades reveals that the era of Britain’s imperial influence—when it was known as "the empire on which the sun never sets"—is long gone. Britains role, even with its deep historical ties to Sudan as a former colony until 1956, has diminished significantly. Today, its positions and actions often align with those of the United States, whether in peace or in war.
With the exception of the Jeddah platform, an extension of the Quad Mechanism that excluded the UAE and Britain, and the neighboring countries’ initiative led by Egypt, Britain has been notably absent from attempts to resolve Sudans war. This absence is striking given its deep understanding of Sudan’s political complexities.
The UKs indifference toward Sudan was symbolized diplomatically when it abolished the role of its Special Envoy to Khartoum and Juba, entrusting Sudan-related responsibilities to its Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. This decision came despite Britain’s official designation as the "penholder" for Sudan at the United Nations, responsible for drafting Security Council resolutions. Yet, as the war rages, Britain’s performance appears lackluster.
Some might argue that Britain’s recent move—proposing a Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, adherence to the Jeddah agreements, civilian protection, and humanitarian aid access—demonstrates its continued involvement in Sudan’s crisis. British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly claimed that Britain "has not forgotten Sudan." However, it is clear that Britain’s proposal was heavily influenced by U.S. policy, with the resolution being essentially "American cuisine served in British pots."
The British-led resolution failed to pass in the Security Council, despite receiving 14 out of 15 votes, as it was vetoed by Russia. This failure has no connection to the misleading triumphalism found in some Sudanese media outlets or the deceptive narratives of certain diplomatic factions.
Britains broader role in Sudanese affairs has waned, with the UK seeming to believe that the presence of Giles Lever as head of its Sudan office, or Julian Reilly as Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, suffices for understanding Sudan’s political landscape. This misjudgment was evident in Britain’s weak performance on the Sudan file, even as Russia paid close attention, going so far as to exercise its veto power.
This British misstep reflects two realities: first, its alignment with U.S. positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, and second, its failure to keep pace with Sudan’s complex issues, particularly after the departure of its last ambassador to Sudan, Irfan Siddiq. The UK appears to have lost touch with one of its most significant former colonies.
Russia’s veto—used to block the British resolution on Sudan—offers a lesson in international diplomacy. Even Russia refrained from using its veto to defend its key ally, Syria, during critical moments when opposition forces advanced on Damascus. Such lessons highlight the need for serious diplomatic engagement, something Britain appears to have neglected in the Sudan file.
Belatedly, Britain has re-engaged with Sudan’s war by appointing Richard Crowder as Special Envoy to Sudan. This move aims to salvage Britain’s standing after the failure of its Security Council resolution. However, in his first meetings, the British envoy merely echoed calls for a ceasefire and highlighted British humanitarian aid—positions already advanced by smaller but more active actors, like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Such gestures are insufficient for addressing Sudan’s dire crisis or breaking the cycle of ineffective diplomatic efforts.
The reliance on special envoys by nations seeking influence is no longer a convincing approach, particularly given the magnitude of Sudan’s challenges. For Britain to reassess its policies in Africa—and Sudan specifically—it must move beyond merely following U.S. initiatives. This is exemplified by the departure of U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello, whose tenure ended with similar ceremonial meetings and little progress. If the "branch" of American diplomacy failed, its "shadow" in Britain cannot succeed without a new strategy.
Britain must adopt a fresh diplomatic perspective that accounts for Sudan’s complex and evolving dynamics, including the regional and international repercussions of its ongoing war. Only then can it hope to regain relevance in a region where its influence has long faded.
