Post-War Questions: The Sudanese Army We Want

By: Ameer Babiker Abdalla
Events in Sudanese affairs are accelerating on both internal and external fronts in a dizzying sequence, pushing post-war questions to the fore long before the war has come to an end. While the Army Chief of Staff, General Yasir Al-Atta, spoke of visions regarding the future of political authority after the war, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan called—in an article published by Foreign Policy magazine—for building a security system based on a single national army under civilian supervision, rather than a multiplicity of armed forces and military loyalties.

As much as the call for a single national army seems clear and understandable in a modern state, in the Sudanese context it raises questions far deeper than merely unifying armed formations. The question that ought to precede "What army do we want?" is: "What state do we want this army to belong to?" For the call to build a single army—which in part is an acknowledgment of the reality of multiple armies and armed power centers that have accompanied Sudans modern history—will remain incomplete unless linked to a comprehensive project to re-establish the state along with its social and constitutional contract.

Upon independence, Sudan inherited a state apparatus formed under colonialism, including its military establishment. It was never afforded adequate opportunity to reshape these institutions according to a consensus-based national project that defines the nature of the state, its supreme objectives, and how its institutions relate to one another. Lowering the colonizers flag and raising the national flag was not enough to transform inherited state institutions into national ones deriving their legitimacy from an inclusive social contract.

Hence, a national army cannot merely be a military institution unified in command, uniform, and weaponry; rather, it must be an institution deriving its doctrine from the overarching doctrine of the state itself. If the state lacks an agreed-upon national project, talking about a stable military doctrine remains an incomplete conversation. Military doctrine, in its essence, is nothing more than the military expression of the states vision for its security, supreme interests, limits on the use of force, and relationship with society and governance.

Amid the chaos of the Sudanese state and its historical inability to monopolize legitimate violence, the proliferation of armed forces and loyalties appears as a natural result of a long trajectory of wars, coups, and socio-political conflicts. Therefore, ending the multiplicity of armies should not be understood as a solitary military operation, but rather as part of a larger process of state-building that regulates the military establishments relationship with authority, society, the economy, and the rule of law.

Emerging from war—regardless of the nature of the settlement ending the fighting—will not by itself resolve the crisis of multiple armies and militias, nor the causes behind their emergence. The state may sign peace agreements, execute security and military protocols, and announce arrangements for integration, disarmament, and redeployment; yet, if the underlying causes that produced this fragmented armed power persist, Sudan may simply circle back to the same starting point: war, followed by peace, followed by another war, in a recurring cycle under different guises.

A single national army, despite its importance, does not solve the problem simply by unifying forces under one command. Armed formations may unite while the military culture itself remains unchanged, the relationship with politics and the economy stays as is, and the military establishment remains a player in the competition for power. In that scenario, we would have unified the structure without altering the nature of the role.

A professional army is not merely one possessing a unified command and a clear hierarchy; it is an institution subject to the constitution and the law, deriving its doctrine from agreed-upon national principles, committing to the decisions of civilian authority, and refraining from becoming a party to political power struggles. In a democratic state, keeping the army out of politics does not mean stripping military personnel of their rights as citizens; rather, it means separating the military establishment from political competition over power.

It is natural for the army to remain an influential institution, as it is the entity supposed to monopolize legitimate violence in the state by virtue of its function. However, to transition from a state where arms dictate politics to a state where institutions govern the relationship between arms and politics, numerous questions arise on the eve of anticipated peace. These serve as indicators of where the situation is headed, and without answering them, we will remain stuck in place. In all constitutions of civilian states, armies remain subject to political authority and their spending is subjected to legislative oversight. Even declaring war is a political decision in which the army plays a central role, yet one connected to all of the states legislative, economic, media, and other institutions—facets that determine whether the army we want is an institution protecting the state and its agreed-upon constitution, or whether it will remain the center of political decision-making.

There is another issue of equal importance: the military economy. Internal wars in Sudan have made the economy a core component of the power equation, linking natural resources, trade, corporations, ports, supply chains, and financial networks—to varying degrees—to political and security influence. Therefore, reforming the military establishment cannot be complete if the military economy remains outside the rules of transparency and oversight.

This does not mean weakening the army or depriving it of legitimate resources; rather, it means establishing clear rules that separate the resources the institution requires to perform its duty from economic activity that could turn into an independent source of political power. An army possessing arms alongside political and economic influence becomes far more difficult to subject to civilian authority, transforming the institution from a tool for state protection into a power center capable of steering its direction.

One question consistently tied to Sudans wars and previous peace agreements is how to deal with armies that fought against the regular army or those that supported it. In all past peace agreements—starting from the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement down to the most recent accords—the trend in designing Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs was to address forces opposing the army as the primary focus.

The reality is far more complex following the April war. Many militias and irregular armies—exceeding 100 fighting formations—are linked in one way or another to either the army or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The matter no longer concerns soldiers belonging to a single faction fighting the Sudanese army, but armed formations, command structures, economic interests, spheres of influence, and armed movements with prior political agreements, in addition to the widespread proliferation of weapons among local communities and civilians. Therefore, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration cannot be a mere process of collecting weapons and removing fighters from the field.

Absorbing large numbers of fighters into the regular forces may seem like a quick fix, but it will turn into a new problem if based on political quotas, political loyalties, or prior military weight. A national army should not become a coalition of forces emerging from war; otherwise, the conflict may simply shift from the battlefield into the military institution itself.

Hence, integration must be subject to clear professional standards regarding training, competence, rank, legal record, and fitness for service—not the size of the force an individual or movement previously commanded. As for those who do not meet the criteria for military service, a clear path must be provided for demobilization and civilian reintegration.

All of this remains contingent upon the nature of the state under whose umbrella these measures will be conducted, as well as the clarity of its overarching doctrine. A strong state is not one possessing the largest number of soldiers and weapons, but one capable of managing its disputes without war, changing its governments without coups, applying the law without discrimination, and protecting its citizens without turning them into adversaries. A strong army does not contradict a civilian state; rather, it needs one just as much as a civilian state needs a professional army capable of safeguarding its borders and sovereignty.